Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

Gina M. Hill v. Dr. Carl Dickerson : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David G. Williams; Terance L. Rooney; Snow, Christensen and Martineau; Attorneys for Appellee.
Douglas M. Durbano; Walter T. Merrill; Durbano and Associates; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Hill v. Dickerson, No. 920271 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4208

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRJEF
UTAH
DCCX:vi£NT
KFU
50

DOCKET NO. ?^a^?

T

f

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GINA M. HILL,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 920271-CA
vs.
DR. CARL DICKERSON,

Priority No. 16

Defendant/Appellee.
APPEAL FROM ORDER OF DISMISSAL
OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, JUDGE W. BRENT WEST, PRO TEM
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

DOUGLAS M. DURBANO (#4209)
WALTER T. MERRILL (#6003)
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES
3340 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone (801) 621-4111
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant, Gina M. Hill
DAVID G. WILLIAMS
TERANCE L. ROONEY
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellee, Dr. Carl Dickerson

FILED
MAY 2 7 1992

COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GINA M. HILL,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 920271-CA
vs.
DR. CARL DICKERSON,

Priority No. 16

Defendant/Appellee.
APPEAL FROM ORDER OF DISMISSAL
OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, JUDGE W. BRENT WEST, PRO TEM
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

DOUGLAS M. DURBANO (#4209)
WALTER T. MERRILL (#6003)
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES
3340 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84403
Telephone (801) 621-4111
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant, Gina M. Hill
DAVID G. WILLIAMS
TERANCE L. ROONEY
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellee, Dr. Carl Dickerson

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

INTRODUCTION

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1

ARGUMENT

1

I.
II.

DEFENDANT HAS MISSTATED SOME CRITICAL
FACTS IN HIS BRIEF
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF HAS PROVIDED NO LEGAL
SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
IN LIMINE WHILE DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE

CONCLUSION

1

4
10

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Page
Bertram v. Harris, 423 P.2d 909
(Alaska 1967 )

5

Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375
(Utah 1988)

9

In re Estate of Gardner, 505 P.2d 50
(Ct. App. Colo. 1972)

5

Kalmus v. Kalmus, 230 P.2d 57
(Ct. App. Cal. 1951)

4

Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938
(Utah 1987 )

8

Salazar v. Ehmann, 505 P.2d 387
(Ct. App. Colo. 1972)

5

ii

INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Plaintiff takes this opportunity to address facts and arguments
raised by Defendant in his Brief of the Appellee.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant has misstated some critical facts in his Brief.
Defendant has also provided no legal support for the trial court's
abuse of discretion in granting Defendant's Motion in Limine while
denying Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance.

Because of the abuse

of discretion involved, the Order entered by the trial courtOctober 7, 1991, should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I. Defendant has Misstated Some Critical Facts in his Brief.
Defendant has asserted in his Brief that the witness list
naming Plaintiff's expert was not transmitted

to Defendant's

counsel by facsimile on August 19, 1992, stating that Plaintiff's
factual account of such transmission was incorrect.

Upon receipt

of Defendant's Brief, counsel undersigned reviewed his file on this
matter once again, to ascertain the truthfulness of Defendant's
claim, and through such procedure, counsel undersigned discovered
that Defendant is correct in this assertion.

Although counsel

undersigned attempted to transmit the witness list to Defendant's
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counsel on August 19, 1991, by facsimile, counsel undersigned was
unable to do so because the facsimile equipment located at the
office of Plaintiff's counsel was not compatible with the facsimile
equipment located at the office of Defendant's counsel.
However, when counsel undersigned was unable to communicate
the witness list to Defendant's counsel by facsimile, desiring that
the information be received by Defendant's counsel as soon as
possible, Defendant's counsel personally delivered the witness list
to the main Salt Lake City post office located at 1769 W. 2100 S.
in Salt Lake City, by 6:00 p.m. on August 19, 1991.

Based upon

past experience, the witness list would have been delivered to
Defendant's counsel's office on August 20, 1991. Based upon past
experience, it is absolutely impossible that the witness list not
arrive at the office of Defendant's counsel until August 22, 1992,
as alleged by Defendant in his Brief.
An additional fact that Defendant implies in his Brief is that
Plaintiff did not make a Motion for Continuance until Monday,
August

26, 1991, the morning

of

trial.

On

the

contrary,

Plaintiff's counsel made a motion for continuance during the
telephone

conference

on

Friday, August

23, 1991.

However,

Plaintiff is unable to establish this fact in the record, as the
transcript

of

the

misplaced or erased.

telephone

hearing

has

been

inconveniently

This is precisely the missing evidence from

this hearing that would support Plaintiff's position, justifying
the reversal of the Order entered October 7, 1991.
HILL V. DICKERSON
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In paragraph 5 of the Statement of Facts in Defendant's Brief,
he misstates that "on Friday, April 5, 1991 Dr. Larsen advised them
he would not testify as an expert witness against Dr. Dickerson, or
at least would not give them the opinions they desired."
a total misstatement of fact.

This is

Dr. Larsen felt at the time, and

still does to Plaintiff's knowledge, that Dr. Dickerson committed
dental malpractice.

The only reason Dr. Larsen reneged on his

agreement to be Plaintiff's expert was his fear that testifying
against a local dentist might have an adverse effect on his own
practice. Another misstatement of fact is found in paragraph 10 of
the Statement of Facts in Defendant's Brief, in which Defendant
claims that the mediation conference was a culmination of the
settlement discussions.
record that

There is absolutely no evidence on the

the parties agreed that this was the culmination of

settlement efforts.

On the contrary, the evidence reflects that

Plaintiff's understanding was just the opposite.
Finally, in paragraph 16 of his Statement of Facts, Defendant
misstates that "plaintiff suggested and agreed that the trial court
should dismiss the case rather than have plaintiff present her case
without expert testimony and have the trial court direct a verdict
against her."

It is true that Judge West intended to direct a

verdict against Plaintiff if she put on her case without expert
testimony.

However, Plaintiff never suggested or agreed that for

that reason the case should be dismissed with prejudice.
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II. Defendant's Brief has Provided no Legal Support of
the Trial Court's Abuse of Discretion in Granting
Defendant's Motion in Limine While Denying Plaintiff's
Motion for Continuance.
The only legal precedent which Defendant has cited in his
Brief in an effort to support the trial court's abuse of discretion
is an old case from the California Court of Appeals, Kalmus v.
Kalmus, 230 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. Cal. 1951).

In Kalmus, the Plaintiff

sought a continuance for two reasons, illness and because another
action was currently pending in a different state on the matter.
In that case, the plaintiff's Motion for Continuance was denied as
a result of evidence establishing that her illness was insufficient
to preclude her travel to California, and that the second action inMassachusetts was only filed by the plaintiff after she received an
adverse ruling in the California case filed earlier. _Id. at 62-64.
Thus, Kalmus is factually totally dissimilar from the case at bar.
Notwithstanding the dissimilarity, the Kalmus opinion, as
quoted by Defendant in his Brief, supports Plaintiff's appeal. In
Kalmus, the court stated that cases should be "determined with as
great promptness as the exigencies of the case will permit."
at 63.
time,

Id.

In the case at bar, a continuance for a short period of
for instance two weeks, to allow Defendant

to depose

Plaintiff's expert, in a case which had been pending for two years,
should be considered prompt.

Since the exigencies of the case at

bar were such that the denial of such a short delay in the
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trial has caused extreme prejudice to Plaintiff, the lower court
should have granted Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance.
In his brief, Defendant goes on to cite two additional cases
from Colorado and one from Alaska in an effort to support the trial
court's abuse of discretion.

In the first case, In re Estate of

Gardner, 505 P. 2d 50 (Ct. App. Colo. 1972), the Colorado Court of
Appeals upheld the trial court's refusal to allow the testimony of
a witness who was not identified until the trial had commenced.
Id. at 51-52.

In Salazar v. Ehmann, 505 P.2d 387 (Ct. App. Colo.

1972), the same court found no abuse of discretion when the trial
court refused to allow a police officer to testify who also had not
been identified until the commencement of trial. JA. at 390. The
identical issue is discussed by the Alaska Supreme Court in Bertram
v. Harris, 423 P.2d 909, 917 (Alaska 1967).
None of the above cases involve the denial of a Motion for
Continuance in conjunction with the grant of a Motion in Limine
precluding the testimony of witnesses.

In addition, the decision

in the cases cited above to preclude testimony of certain witnesses
did not have the result of throwing the plaintiff out of court,
denying the plaintiff in those cases the opportunity to present his
or her case to the court. For that reason, none of the three cases
cited above is dispositive in the situation at bar.

Indeed,

Plaintiff submits to this court that Defendant's inability to find
legal support for the trial court's determination in this case is
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easily explained. It is Plaintiff's belief that no trial court has
ever abused its discretion in this manner, the appellate report of
which would provide precedent for Defendant's position.
On pages 16 and 17 of his Brief, Defendant discusses the
factors which the trial court allegedly considered in denying
Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance.

One of these factors is

totally irrelevant to the denial of the Motion for Continuance,
i.e.

the

time

available, between

Plaintiff's

designation

of

witnesses and the trial, for Defendant to take depositions. While
this factor is relevant in the court's determination on Defendant's
Motion in Limine, such factor has no bearing whatsoever on the
determination of a Motion for Continuance.

An examination of some

of the other factors Defendant has cited will help illuminate the
trial court's abuse of discretion in denying Plaintiff's Motion for
Continuance.
Defendant places great emphasis on Plaintiff's "violation" of
the order of the lower court to designate expert witnesses by April
19, 1991, as a determining factor in the lower court's denial of
Plaintiff's second Motion for Continuance. From the transcript of
the proceeding on August 26, 1991, it appears that the trial court
placed great emphasis on this factor as well.

This emphasis would

be well placed, except for the fact that Defendant reached an
agreement with Plaintiff that she would not be required to comply
with that order until settlement negotiations failed.
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It is no

wonder that Defendant opposed so vigorously Plaintiff's Motion to
Supplement the Record on Appeal to include the letter confirming
this arrangement.

Defendant should not be allowed to enter into

such an agreement, and then to have Plaintiff's cause of action
dismissed with prejudice because the agreement "violated" the court
order.

Due to this agreement, the trial

court abused

its

discretion in factoring this "violation" into its determination to
deny Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance.
Defendant also argues that, even if an agreement was reached,
it terminated at the time the mediation conference was held.
However, there is absolutely no evidence in the record of the
parties'

agreement

that

the

mediation

culmination of settlement efforts.

conference

was

the

On the contrary, the record

reveals that Plaintiff never considered the mediation conference to
be the culmination of settlement negotiations.

Thus, Plaintiff's

efforts to name her expert witness two weeks prior to trial was in
accord

with

Defendant's

the

agreement

refusal

to

between

cooperate,

the

parties, and

Plaintiff's

due

Motion

to
for

Continuance should have been granted.
Defendant also states that a factor the lower court used in
denying the Motion for Continuance was the "extreme prejudice" that
the grant of the Motion would have had upon Defendant.

Again,

there is absolutely no evidence in the record of any prejudice, let
alone any extreme prejudice, which would have resulted to Defendant

HILL V. DICKERSON
Case No. 920271-CA

-7-

by a short continuance of the trial of this matter.

If any party

to this action has been extremely prejudiced, it is obviously
Plaintiff,

by

the

trial

court's

denial

of

her

Motion

for

Continuance, precluding her from her day in court. Based upon the
factors

which

the

trial

court

should

have

applied

in

its

determination of Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance, the Motion
should have been granted.
On the morning of trial, August 26, 1991, the lower court also
expressed a judicial economy argument against granting the Motion
for Continuance, stating that the Motion should have been brought
earlier.

However, the Motion was not brought on the morning of

trial but was brought the previous Friday, and if the Motion had
been granted at that time, it would have allowed the clerk of the
lower court sufficient time to contact the panel of proposed jurors
who were scheduled to arrive at the court Monday morning.

The

missing transcript of the telephone hearing on Friday, August 23,
1991,

might

reveal

the

trial

court's

motivation

in

taking

Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance under advisement at that time,
whether it was an attempt to force the parties to settle or simply
a power play by a Circuit Court Judge sitting pro tern on the
District Court bench. Unfortunately, this court is now handicapped
on this issue, because the record of the Friday telephone hearing
is lost.
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Defendant's argument that the missing transcript must be
presumed to support the lower court's decision, citing Mascaro v.
Davis, 741 P. 2d 938 (Utah 1987), is misplaced.

Under Mascaro,

missing portions of the record are presumed to support the trial
court's determination only when the items are missing from the
record as a result of the fault of one of the parties. _Id. at 943.
Mascaro does not stand for the proposition that missing items in
the record, which are missing due to the fault of the court, are
presumed to support the trial court's determination.

On the

contrary, in the case at bar, the missing transcript of the
telephone hearing, whether due to the negligence or intentional
conduct of the lower court, strongly supports the reversal of trie
trial court's Order dated October 7, 1991.
Defendant's final argument in his Brief is that a dismissal
without

prejudice

in

this

case

would

have

been

senseless.

Plaintiff strongly disagrees that such a ruling would have been the
equivalent of a continuance, because Plaintiff would have been
required to refile and commence her lawsuit over again which,
although prejudicial to her, would still have allowed her a day in
court.

On the contrary, the lower court abused its discretion in

applying the harsh and permanent remedy of a dismissal with
prejudice.
Defendant has wholly

failed

in his Brief

to refute or

distinguish the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Christenson v.
Jewkes, 761 P. 2d 1375 (Utah 1988), in which the Court found that it
HILL V. DICKERSON
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was not an abuse of discretion to allow testimony of an expert who
was designated only five days before trial, but who was made
available for interview or deposition, when the other party simply
chose not to take advantage of either option. .Id., at 1377-78. The
factual similarities between Christenson and the case at bar lend
great

support to Plaintiff's

appeal hereunder.

In granting

Plaintiff's Motion in Limine, precluding any expert testimony on
behalf of Plaintiff, while denying Plaintiff's request for a short
continuance, the trial court abused its discretion, and Plaintiff
should be entitled to her day in court.

CONCLUSION
For the additional reasons set forth above, as well as those
contained in Plaintiff's original Brief, Plaintiff respectfully
requests that this court reverse the Order of the trial court
entered October 7, 1991, denying her Motion for Continuance and
dismissing this action with prejudice, remanding the matter back to
the trial court to schedule a new trial date.
DATED this

3y

day of May, 1991.

)UGLAS M. DURBANO
"'
DOUGLAS
WALTER T. MERRILL
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY, that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Reply Brief of the Appellant to David G. Williams and
Terance L. Rooney, SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU, 10 Exchange
Place, 11th Floor, P.O. Box 3000, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84110,
postage pre-paid on this

day of May, 1992.
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